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1 Introduction
During the last decade there has been a growing interest in issues of market microstructure
and behavioral finance. Among the still unresolved problems of an optimal design of stock
exchanges the relation between market efficiency and the information aggregation process
driven by the investors´ behavior and market design is one of the most interesting topics.
Modern but traditional theory of financial markets is based on the assumption that the
investors in the market are rational in two perspectives: An economic subject (homo
oeconomicus) first makes decisions based on the axioms of von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility theory and second she is able to forecast the future cash flows or market
prices unbiasedly. While the strong version of this theoretical concept that all subjects behave
in accordance with these basic assumptions is no longer valid in the opinion of most scholars,
the „as if“ approach has become the prevailing concept in the scientific community and the
textbooks on financial economics. The theoretical concept is based on the assumption that not
all individual investors have to act fully rational, but it suffices if rational market results
(prices and volumes) obtain: all market participants work together as if they were be rational
agents.
Both theories, the stronger and the weaker version, suggest that the individual processes of
perception and expectation formation and the market processes of information aggregation
and price formation have not to be taken into consideration and modelled. In financial
markets, the transformation from the microlevel to the macro- or marketlevel is done by
definition. It still remains open, based on which assumptions and models an „invisible hand“
turns the individual decisions into the rational market result.
Despite of this, many crucial empirical phenomena like the equity premium puzzle or the
predictability of future stock returns on the basis of past returns weaken the descriptive power
of the neo-classical theory on financial markets. In addition, the existence of decision biases
of well-trained subjects who are convinced of the Bernoulli-rationality give rise to doubt on
the normative power as well.
Figure 1 summarizes the change in paradigms: the traditional view shifts to the market-
microstructure and behavioral-finance paradigm.4
Please insert figure 1 around here
One of the key factors in the international competition of stock exchanges is the design of the
real or virtual market place with regard to the clients´ needs. Basic elements are the trading
rules and institutions (including the technical environment), the listed assets, and the
settlement rules.
Based on the short discussion above, it is worthwile to analyze the price impact of different
trading mechanisms and the legal environment.
While the complexity of and the noise in existing financial markets impede the analysis of the
information-aggregation and the price-formation process and reduce the validity of the results,
the experimental method enables us to control for all major parameters, to vary the available
information for the subjects, and to study potential learning behavior by means of identical
replication of the markets. Furthermore, we can control the investors´ behavior for the use of
private and public information. Therefore, different results can be attributed to the design of
the trading mechanisms and the informational environment.
In contrast, investigations of insider trading based on stock market data from existing
exchanges are very difficult or even impossible because these studies mostly rely on
assumptions about the amount of information and how information is processed for actual
transactions.
Because of the fact that we model the (experimental) situation and not human behavior, we
can precisely compare theoretical predictions and actual behavior in order to explain and to
evaluate the observed differences in the light of future recommendations for the design of
stock exchanges and the legal environment. Our experiments are designed in a manner that
enhances the comparability of the results to those obtained from field studies in existing stock
markets.
We contribute to the gap described by Noeth (1998, 182/3, transl.) that „experimental research
has failed or evade to analyze the behavior of information monopolists or insider behavior in
general, whose behavior is oftenly treated as rational.“5
Our most important results can be summarized as follows. Insider trading does not improve
informational efficiency at all but depresses market liquidity significantly.
At a first glance, the observed spread widening (or decrease of market liquidity) as an impact
of insider behavior leads to the conclusion that our call markets react „as if“ all subjects
behave rationally like dealers in a market making environment. At a second glance, a first
look into the individual data shows that only a smaller group of investors act as „endogenous“
market makers in the call market regime.
Market efficiency is measured as common in empirical capital markets research by the
deviation of the market prices from the fundamental value as the usual benchmark and by the
(endogenous) bid-ask spread which is known from dealer markets.
The paper is organized as follows. We proceed with a short introduction to previous research
and the measurement of efficiency in the context of our work (section 2). Section 3 outlines
the experimental design and procedures and section 4 specifies the hypotheses we will test.
The experimental data and results are presented and analyzed in section 5. The final section
summarizes our results and provides suggestions for further research.
2 Previous Research and Measurement
Quality of Information Aggregation
Friedman (1993) uses the root mean squared error (RMSE) as a measure of price efficiency in
his experimental study on different trading institutions. As the definition below shows, the
measure is based on the difference between the relevant fundamental or „true“ asset value and















with t i p , = i-th market clearing price in period t
t v = fundamental asset value in period t
t c = number of clearing prices in period t
If one uses RMSE as a measure of the quality of information aggregation the market is the
more efficient the lower the value of RMSE is. Schiereck (1997) replicates this measure for
his experimental analysis of call markets.
Theissen (1997) uses a non-squared measure of price efficiency which is based on the
absolute deviation between price and value, divided by the fundamental asset value. The mean














with t p = market clearing price in period t
t v = fundamental value in period t
n = number of periods
The division by the fundamental value can be interpreted as a standardization procedure: the
measure makes experiments series with different asset value levels comparable.
Friedman´s RMSE gives more weight to larger deviations than the MRE. On principle, RMSE
should also be standardized.
In our analyses, the standardized RMSE leads to the same results as MRE, since only one
market clearing price is determined in each period (cf. Friedman 1993). However, medians are
used in place of the arithmetic means (see section 5.1 below).7
Liquidity
Probably based on the general assumptions by Mendelson (1982), Friedman (1993) defines his
measure of liquidity (operational efficiency) of an asset market. He calculates the difference
between the best rejected (extramarginal) bid and ask prices. This concept considers that an
additional buy order reaching the market will be executed at exactly that price on which the
best rejected sell order is limited on (rejected ask) and vice versa. Friedman (1993, 423)
confirms: „This provides an implicit measure of transactions costs that is valid across
institutions.“
This implicit bid-ask spread is quite similar to the market spread in dealer markets if one
assumes that call market participants are allowed to act as a dealer, submitting orders both
with bids and asks. Higher values of the spread correspond to lower liquidity or operational
efficiency of a market. A standardization procedure similar to the price-efficiency measures is
useful and medians are used again to reduce the weight of outliers. Our liquidity measure is
defined as follows:












3 Design and Procedures
3.1 Market Institution and Trading Mechanism
The basic trading mechanism that we used is a call market where a clearinghouse matches buy
and sell orders once in every trading period. After the orders are collected a computer
aggregates them and fixes the market clearing price so that the transaction volume is
maximized. Thus, the call market institution provides a uniform price to all market
participants. In terms of auction theory our market institution is a sealed bid multiple unit
double auction.
If the clearinghouse procedure resulted in an interval of possible prices the midpoint was
chosen. If the calculated price did not clear the market completely, rationing took place under
the following rules: Sell (buy) orders with lower (higher) price limits were executed with first8
priority. In the case of equal limits the orders were rationed proportionally to their order size.
Orders limited to the clearing price were rationed in the same manner.
Traders were allowed to submit buy and/or sell orders. The only restrictions were the budget
constraint and a short-selling restriction (see section 3.3 for details). The minimum tick size
was set to 1 and the price could only take on integer values. Market orders (orders without any
limit price) were not allowed. Such buy (sell) orders can be mimicked by setting the price
limit sufficiently high (low). There are no transaction costs.
Subjects were provided with a fully transparent but anonymized ex-post orderbook (cf.
Oehler/Unser 1998) and an individual message about the order execution at the end of every
trading period.
We conducted 13 experimental sessions with groups of 15 subjects. Each session consists of
16 trading periods. In each experimental call market only one type of asset was traded. The
aspects of limited information processing and bounded rationality in a market design with two
or more asset types is discussed separately (cf. Oehler/Unser 1998).
The market designs of the 13 experimental sessions differ only in the existence of insiders.
Design I (6 groups) represents a call market without insiders, design II implements two
insiders among the 15 subjects. Trading is anonymous in both designs, i.e. the identity of each
trader who submitted an order is never revealed. In design II the traders know that there are
insiders in the market, but they could only identify them by their order behavior.
In design II two insiders were implemented instead of one. This concept was based on the
assumption that the two insiders were forced by the situation to realize their informational
advantage (see below, section 3.2) quickly because they have no opportunity to communicate
or cooperate among each other (cf. Noeth/Weber 1996).
Both designs were conducted as multi-stage markets, i.e. every subject holds his portfolio and
cash from period to period. In contrast to this more realistic market environment, many
comparable experiments in financial markets research use so-called „reset“ markets, i.e. at the
end of each trading period the portfolio and cash is returned to the experimenter and all
participants start the next period with the same new endowment (cf. Krahnen/Weber 1999,
Noeth/Weber 1999, Theissen 1997).9
Some researchers argue that the advantage of the reset market design consists of the subjects´
ability to act every time at both sides of the market because they have no restriction on cash
and assets (cf. Theissen 1997). In addition to the problem that such designs are very
unrealistic the reset design ignores the intertemporal characteristic of expectation formation.
Moreover, the assumption of statistically independent periods does not hold true (with all
consequences for the test statistics, cf. Friedman 1993), since either the information structure
is modelled multiperiodically or no one can assume seriously that a subject´s memory is really
„formatted“ at the start of every new trading period. As a result, the expectation formation
process in reset markets is virtually less complex. In fact, reset markets need the same number
of experimental sessions and subjects as designs with infinitely-lived assets.
3.2 Information Structure and Determination of the Asset Value
Financial market experiments usually incorporate information asymmetries. The standard
procedure to introduce this is to define a small number of states of nature that determine the
asset`s payoff to traders. Subjects were then provided with different access to the relevant
information about the actual state or future states, respectively. In microstructure literature
asymmetric information is commonly introduced by a procedure that provides single (or a
group of) traders with superior information (cf. Plott/Sunder 1982, Glosten/Milgrom 1985,
Kyle 1985, Admati/Pfleiderer 1988).
In our markets traders were provided with the same information about the asset value first.
Two traders were then randomly chosen as insiders. The two insiders in design II got insight
in the future of the determination process of the asset value (see below). The asset value  t v  of
period t is determined by a binomial tree defined by the following five parameters:
•  asset value  1 v  of the first period
•  probability  p of an upward step in the next period
•  probability  p q - =1  of a downward step in the next period
•  extent u of an upward step
•  extent d  of an downward step.10







Every trader receives this table and the expected value  ( ) t t t t v d q v u p v E ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ = +1 . The up
and down step is determined randomly. Figure 2 reveals the whole tree and all the data the
participants could calculate on their own.
Please insert figure 2 around here
The use of the fundamental asset value is twofold.
First, the portfolio of each investor at the end of the last trading period is valued at the asset
value in this period. The payment of the subjects is based on this valuation procedure.
Second,  ( ) t t t t v d q v u p v E ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ = +1  is the only information given to all investors. All
subjects were provided with this expected value at the beginning of each new trading period.
Thus, the whole tree but not the exact branch is revealed to the participants (see figure 2). The
behavior of a rational investor has to be determined by  ( ) T t v E  of the asset value  T v  of the
last trading period.
The superior information of the insiders (design II) consists of a time lag of the non-insiders.
Insiders receive the expected value of the fundamental asset value one period in advance, i.e.
they get the  ( ) 2 + t t v E  at the beginning of each period. Consequently, insiders can make a
better assessment of  T v  and the volatility.11
3.3 Subjects, Endowment, and Experimental Procedures
The experiments were conducted with undergraduate students of the University of Hagen,
Department of Finance and Banking in the winter term 1998/99. In contrast to undergraduates
of other German universities these students normally do their studies parallel to a fulltime job,
mainly in the banking and insurance industry, and invest more money in the stock market (cf.
Oehler 1995). All participants have basic knowledge on financial markets from their studies
and/or practice and participated for the first time and only once.
Subjects received a set of written instructions three weeks before the experiments started. All
questions were answered in this pre-period and some tests were done.
Subjects were endowed with 50 asset units and 35,000 currency units (cu). Shortselling and
borrowing was allowed up to the initial endowment.
As mentioned above investors were rewarded for their participation in dependence of their
sucess which was measured by their final holdings in assets and cash. The value of the end-of-
last-period portfolio was transformed into Deutsche Mark by a known divisor and paid out.
The average payoff for a three hours experiment was DM 37.82, individual payoffs ranged
from DM 0.00 to DM 60.03.
4 Hypotheses
Based on both theoretical and empirical (experimental) literature (for an overview see
Schnitzlein 1996) we derive the working hypothesis that information aggregation is improved
by insider trading. So, insider markets have a higher informational efficiency (see above,
section 2):
Hypothesis 1: Insiders contribute to market efficiency by improving the informational
efficiency.12
Additionally, considering the growing body of theoretical and experimental literature in the
field of market microstructure (cf. Glosten 1989, Pagano/Röell 1996, Schnitzlein 1996), we
expect that insiders lead to a reduction of market liquidity because of the adverse selection
costs the non-insiders are afraid of. This leads to our second working hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The existence of insiders in a market reduces the market liquidity, i.e. widens
the bid-ask spread.
5 Results
5.1 Aggregation of Information
The described information structure and the payment system based on its imply an investment
behavior that is oriented on the binomial tree. Every realization means an adjustment onto the
fundamental asset value that is decisive for the later payoff. The price mechanism has to
aggregate the public and the private information (expectations of all subjects and insiders)
contained in the realizations of the tree.
Please insert table 1.1 around here
According to this, the RMSE (see section 2) is used in a standardized form with medians as a
measure of the quality of aggregation. Table 1.1 shows the results on average for all
experimental sessions. The fact that the deviation of informational efficiency in both designs
is about 30% leads to the conclusion that the first hypothesis cannot be supported. Insiders do
not improve informational efficiency and there is no higher quality in the aggregation function
of the market. The detailed data for every single session (see table 1.2) and the additional
statistical test (Wilcoxon rank sum test) confirm this consideration.
Please insert table 1.2 around here
At a first glance, the results can be interpreted in that way that either the insiders did not
succeed in obtaining the relevant market volume with their orders (problem of market power)13
or the non-insiders were not able to „read“ the informational advantage in the clearing prices
and/or the orders itself (problem of „communication“ or detection via prices).
At a second glance, an additional descriptive analysis of individual investment behavior (see
figure 3) shows that insiders generate a significantly higher profit of about 10% (statistically
significant at the 5%-level) with a lower payoff dispersion at the same time (see
Krahnen/Weber 1999 for similar results).
Please insert figure 3 around here
To classify our results according to the literature we compare our data in table 1.1 with such
from other experimental financial markets. The study by Noeth and Weber (1996, see also
Noeth 1998) uses a comparable design, on principle, but they do their analyses with a reset
market design (see above, section 3.1) and employ the (1–RMSE) measure.
The data of Noeth/Weber in their design „s0“ (without insiders) shows a deviation from full
efficiency in a range between 38% and 60.5% (dependent on the special sub-designs) while
our data in table 1.1 amount to 27.8%.
The design with two insiders in the Noeth/Weber study (design „s2“) improves the efficiency
to a range between 30% and 9%, but their results are statistically not significant. Our insider
design leads to a similar efficiency at 30.8%.
To get a better impression of the investor behavior in our markets figure 4 illustrates the
information structure, the derived expected fundamental asset values during the trading
periods used for the payment and the market clearing prices of each period.
Please insert figure 4 around here
The market prices documented in figure 4 show a more myopic behavior. Investors „anchor“
their clearing prices around the public signal  ( ) 1 + t t v E  which were given at the beginning of
each period. The expectation formation of the subjects is not clearly affected by the
fundamental value in the last period  ( ) T t v E .14
Overall, these findings suggest a deeper analysis on the individual level which constitutes the
special advantage of experimental markets. We hope to contribute to the result by
Krahnen/Weber (1999, 19) who remark „...we do not find a clear difference in behavior
between informed and uninformed traders, however, informed traders earn more than
uninformed ones“.
5.2 Liquidity
A market is considered to be liquid when a listed asset can be bought or sold rapidly and at a
price close to the equilibrium value. Accordingly, we have defined in section 2 the liquidity
measure ARS for our call markets with discrete points in time where the market price is
calculated.
Table 2.1 shows the results for ARS on average, table 2.2 documents the same for each
datapoint (experiment).
Please insert table 2.1 and 2.2 around here
The data show that our second hypothesis cannot be rejected, i.e. liquidity decreases in design
II (with insiders) in comparison with design I. The difference between the two market designs
is significant at the 10%-level (Wilcoxon rank sum test; 6.88%).
Our 6.1% spread in design I can be qualified by other experimental studies. Schiereck (1997)
reaches about 9% to 10% and Theissen (1999) documents 2%, but with a „reset“-market
design.
An alternative way for the standardization of the relative spreads which is discussed by Rubio
and Tapia (1996) is the midquote. Our results with both measures are quite similar.
In the perspective of the modern capital market theory the results of the spread widening can
be explained with the „as if“ approach. The investors behave in the aggregate as if they were
rational dealers (market makers) who are afraid of adverse selection costs, i.e they avoid to
contract with an informed investor.15
On a descriptive level, this explanation is not really satisfactory because in a call or
clearinghouse market an „invisible hand“ is necessary that coordinates the individual orders to
a wider spread.
Hence, an analysis on an individual level is helpful and experiments are cutted out for such a
procedure. Findings of a first analysis on the individual behavior indicate that in every trading
period about 20% to 25% of the investors behave like a dealer, i.e. quote bid and ask. The
spread of such implicit or „endogenous“ market makers increases by about 24% on average
from design I to design II.
6 Summary and Conclusion
Using a design that incorporates asymmetric information, we find that the call market
institution with insider trading yields similar informational efficiency but lower operational
efficiency (liquidity) than a clearing house without any informed investors.
Interestingly, „the market“ as a whole successfully acts against informed participants with a
significant spread widening. Analyses on the micro level indicate that this behavior of the
aggregate is caused by a group of investors who exhibit the trading pattern of (implicit)
dealers.
But this is only the first step of an fruitful analysis of individual investor behavior in markets.
Further results are expected in the study of behavioral patterns and their differences between
insiders and uninformed subjects, e.g. a contribution to the question why insiders generated
more profit. Accordingly, the relative success of individual trading strategies should be
analyzed.
Moreover, the results from call markets should to be contrasted with such from similar
designs from continuous auction and (exogenous) dealer markets to clarify whether a market
institution (trading system) dominates another with regard to criteria like informational
efficiency (quality of information aggregation) or liquidity.
We end with the ritual cry for further work to finally answer the question, whether insiders
enforce or depress market efficiency and whether one market institution is more robust against
insider trading than another.16
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Figure 2: Generating the fundamental asset value with a binomial tree





8,916 8,559 8,217 1.5%
7,430 7,133 6,848
6,192 5,944 5,706 5,478 4.7%
5,160 4,953 4,755 4,565
4,300 4,128 3,963 3,804 3,652 10.1%
3,583 3,440 3,302 3,170 3,043
2,986 2,867 2,752 2,642 2,536 2,435 16.2%
2,488 2,389 2,293 2,202 2,113 2,029
2,074 1,991 1,911 1,835 1,761 1,691 1,623 19.8%
1,728 1,659 1,593 1,529 1,468 1,409 1,353
1,440 1,382 1,327 1,274 1,223 1,174 1,127 1,082 18.9%
1,200 1,152 1,106 1,062 1,019 978 939 902
1,000 960 922 885 849 815 783 751 721 14.2%
800 768 737 708 679 652 626 601
640 614 590 566 544 522 501 481 8.4%
512 492 472 453 435 417 401
410 393 377 362 348 334 321 3.9%
328 315 302 290 278 267
262 252 242 232 223 214 1.4%
210 201 193 186 178
168 161 155 148 142 0.4%
134 129 124 119
107 103 99 95 0.1%
86 82 79
69 66 63 0.0%
55 53
44 42 0.0%
(*) probability of this fundamental asset value in period 17, calculated in period 1 35
28 0.0%
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 [P17]
fundamental asset values 1,000 1,200 1,440 1,728 1,382 1,106 1,327 1,593 1,911 1,529 1,835 1,468 1,174 1,409 1,691 1,353 1,623
delivered expected fund. values Et(vt+1) 1,040 1,248 1,498 1,797 1,438 1,150 1,380 1,656 1,987 1,590 1,908 1,526 1,221 1,465 1,758 1,407







Table 1.1: Results on Information aggregation – Overview
The table shows the results of the RMSE measure on informational efficiency for
both designs:
I = without insiders
II = with 2 insiders
The highest quality of informational efficiency is reached when the measure´s value
amounts to 0%.
We use medians instead of means in the averaging procedure to give not too much
weight to outliers (cf. Noeth 1998). Additionally, the Wilcoxon rank sum test uses this
measure. Results calculated with the mean are quite similar.
Market
design




Table 1.2: Results on Information aggregation – Details
The table shows the results of the RMSE measure on informational efficiency for
both designs:
I = without insiders
II = with 2 insiders
The highest quality of informational efficiency is reached when the measure´s value
amounts to 0%.




RMSE – Median % –datapoints (experiments)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I 24.4 24.2 26.0 33.3 30.9 29.6 —
II 23.7 20.8 36.5 28.0 34.9 30.8 34.6
Standardized20






























































































































































































































































m  = DM 40.29
s  = DM 4.10
Non-Insiders:
m = DM 37.62
s = DM 6.8721


































P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 [P17]
market clearing prices (design I)
delivered expected fund. values Et(vt+1)
expected asset values for the payoff Et(vT)Table 2.1: Results on liquidity – Overview
The table shows the results of the (implicit) bid-ask spread as the liquidity measure
for both designs (averaged relative spread standardized with the fundamental value):
I = without insiders
II = with 2 insiders
We use medians instead of means in the averaging procedure to give not too much
weight to outliers (cf. Noeth 1998). Additionally, the Wilcoxon rank sum test uses this
measure. Results calculated with the mean are quite similar.
Market
design
ARS – Median %
I 6.1
    II 10.2
Standardized
Table 2.2: Results on liquidity – Details
The table shows the results of the (implicit) bid-ask spread as the liquidity measure
for both designs (averaged relative spread standardized with the fundamental value):
I = without insiders
II = with 2 insiders




ARS – Median % – datapoints (experiments)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I 5.0 6.7 7.0 5.6 9.6 5.5 —
II 12.4 10.2 11.0 7.5 4.0 6.1 12.0
Standardized